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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TH_E,.:~-ATE INSURANCE ~~i~~ff. ) 
,liE INDUSTRIAL CO~f1IISSION 
OF UT1\H, ALFRED LUND and 
lTNITED PARI{ CITY l\IINES 
Defendants. 
Case 
No.10095 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
UNITED PARK CIT'Y MINES CO. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a claim under the Utah Occupational Disease 
Law (herein called the "0. D. Law") for permanent dis-
ability benefits by reason for silicotuberculosis. Defend-
ant United Park City Mines Company (herein called ''de-
fendant employer") and plaintiff are in dispute as to 
which of them has obligation to pay whatever benefits 
defendant Alfred Lund {herein called ''defendant 
Lund'') is entitled to receive. Defendant employer joins 
plaintiff, however, in plaintiff's assertion that defendant 
1 
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Lund's exposure does not satisfy the requirements of the 
0. D. Law and that, on any findings of facts the evidence 
will support, benefits may not properly be a\\7 arded in 
this case. 
STATEj\IENT OF FACTS 
Defendant employer adopts and concurs in plaintiff's 
statement of facts, with the following addition: 
1. During the period from December 1, 1961, through 
December 30, 1961,. defendant Lund was employed 
under conditions which entailed as much exposure 
to silicon dioxide dust as did the conditions of his 
employment with defendant employer during any 
previous period after he began working above 
ground in 1931. In his employment during De-
cember of 1961, defendant Lund was engaged in 
cleaning dried mine muck (having the silicon 
content characteristic of the mine) off tools, and 
his use of a respirator in that work was necessary 
(R. 38). In his previous jobs after 1931, he 
worked above ground ( R. 33), and there is no 
evidence that his exposure was anything but the 
common experience of all residents of the Park 
City community. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IF THE DISABILITY IN THE INSTANT 
CASE IS COMPENSABLE, PLAINTIFF, AS 
THE COl\!PENSATION INSURANCE CAR-
2 
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I~I~~R 1\rr TIIE TI:\IES "THICH .. \RE DE-
rri~~R \IIX .\ TIVE, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
I) ..c\ }T \I :B~NT. 
Plaintiff primarily argues the evidence does not sup-
port thP Commission's finding that defendant Lund was 
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust for 
five of the fifteen years preceding his disablement. As 
've have indicated, we fully concur in plaintiff's argument 
in this regard. 
If the exposure has been sufficient, however, plain-
tiff still asserts its freedom from responsibility, and it 
does so on two theories. It will be defendant employer's 
purpose in this brief to explore those two theories and 
demonstrate their invalidity. 
A 
Plaintiff's Arg?tment That, If There Was Five 
r· ears Exposure in the Last Fifteen., None of It 
Was After December 1, 1961. 
Plaintiff was the carrier for defendant employer for 
30 da~·~ before defendant Lund's employment with 
defendant employer terminated. Plaintiff asserts (and 
we concur) that it cannot be liable unless there was some 
harmful exposure during that 30 days. We might well 
agree that the December employment did not entail harm-
ful exposure, but we must certainly contradict plaintiff's 
averment that the evidence less strongly supports a find-
ing of harmful December exposure than it supports that 
finding with reference to any previous employment pe-
riod after 1931. The strongest evidence of harmful ex-
posure defendant Lund presented at the hearing had 
3 
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relation only to his work in the carpenter shop at Keetley. 
During that employment, he was cleaning dried muck off 
tools with an emery wheel - an activity which created 
so much dust that a. respirator was acknowledged to be 
necessary. Besides that, defendant Lund continued to be 
exposed to whatever general dust conditions prevailed in 
a mining community. 
Before he moved to Keetley, defendant Lund's expo-
sure was not direct and was aggravated, if at all, only 
when the wind off the mine dump caused general atmos-
pheric pollution. We do not believe the 0. D. Law con-
templates that an employer should be responsible for 
disease processes attributable to the kind of exposure 
which all residents in an area where the soil has silica 
content must endure. This was the nature of defendant 
Lund's exposure until May 1, 1957 (see plaintiff's brief, 
page 3) when he was transferred to Keetley. 
If there was any harmful exposure after defendant 
Lund came out of the mine in 1931, it was certainly the 
exposure entailed in the tool cleaning and associated ac-
tivity at Keetley. The Commission specifically found the 
exposure in December to have been harmful (R. 86) 
and, if the record supports any Commission finding, it 
supports that one. 
B 
Plaintiff's .Argument That the .Jet Requires 30 
Sepa.rate Days of Harnlful Exposure iu the Em-
ploy1nent of au En1ployer Before That Enzployer 
Can Haz'e Responsibility. 
4 
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Before undertaking to criticise this argument, we 
should makP it clear that \VC deny that plaintiff could es-
<·ape responsibility in this case even if it were conclu-
sively demonstrated that plaintiff was not the compensa-
tion car1ier ''during a period of thirty days'' when the 
applicant \vas harmfully exposed. An entire section of 
this brief will be devoted to this point. Nevertheless, we 
feel the position should be asserted that (even if the re-
quirenH_1nts of Section 35-2-14 had to be satisfied 'vith 
reference to insurance carriers as well as employers) the 
t1xposure in the instant case, if it was harmful at all, "\vas 
sufficient during December of 1961 so that plaintiff is 
responsible. 
Section 35-2-14 initially provided that the only em-
ployer liable would be the one in whose employment the 
employee had last been harmfully exposed ''during a 
period of s ix·t y days or more.'' From a medical point of 
Yiew, even a sixty-day continuous exposure would be a 
ridiculous basis on which to predicate responsibility for 
the disease. Our legislature (Section 35-2-13, U.C.A. 
1953) clearly recognized, in conformity with accepted 
medical doctrine, that five years' exposure is the least 
whirh will produce the disease. The sixty (now thirty) 
day period of employment which imposes the compensa-
tion obligation on an employer was never intended as a 
~tandard of culpable exposure. The sixty-day period after 
\vhich an employer would become responsible \Yas provid-
ed for only one reason- so that a.n employer would have 
time to ma.ke an appropriate investigation to determine 
whether a new employee was free enough from lung dis-
5 
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ease so that he could safely be retained in employment. 
Otherwise, no employer could afford to employ a miner 
until it had been determined that the miner \vas not al-
ready silicotic. The sixty-day grace period made it pos-
sible for hard rock miners to avoid long hiatuses in their 
employment while employers made sure it was safe to 
employ them. It also gave employers a reasonable pe-
riod after the effective date of the 0. D. I..~a"· "·ithiu 
which to ''clean up" their mines. 
If the reason for the ''thirty day period'' is under-
stood, plaintiff's argument that the employee must sho"~ 
exposure on thirty separate days loses all its vitality. 
An employee need only show his last harmful exposure 
was during (not on each of) thirty days when he had the 
status of employee of the employer against \vhom he as-
serts his claim. In the instant case, plaintiff was the 
defendant employer's insurance carrier "during a pe-
riod of thirty days'' within which defendant was harm-
fully exposed after 1931. 
POINT II. 
THAT INSURANCE CARRIER IS LIABLE TO 
PAY BENEFITS FOR SILICOSIS WHICH 
WAS '{ON THE RISK'' AT THE TilVIE OF 
LAST EXPOSURE, AND THERE IS NO STAT-
UTORY REQUIREMENT TI!~L\_T THE LIABLE 
CARRIER HAVE BEEN ''ON THE RISK'' 
FOR THIRTY DAYS. 
Plaintiff's final argument begins \vith the assumption 
that this court "Till hold that the exposure ''during a 
thirty day period" (as required by Section 33-~-14 in 
6 
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order to mnkP the last employ(\r liable) must be harmful 
exposure or1 Paeh of 30 separate days. \\7 e "~in say no 
more about ho"· ill-,varranted that assumption is. The 
ingenious argum(l1lt is that Section 35-2-14 limits respon-
~ibility not only to the last employer in "·hose employ-
rncnt thP employee "'as last exposed during 30 days but 
also to the la.st insurance company "·ho insured th0 lia-
hlP employer during a 30-day period w·hen the employee 
wa~ exposed. 
By urging such a construction of this section, \vhirh 
reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
''Where compensation is payable for an occupa-
tional disease the only employer liable shall be the 
employer in whose employment the employee was 
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such 
disease, provided that in the case of silicosis the 
only employer liable shall be the employer in 
"·hose employment the employee was last exposed 
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide ( Si02) 
dust during a period of thirty days or more after 
the effective date of this act." 
Plaintiff asks this Court to engage in a monumental ef-
fort of judicial legislating. There is no word in the 
section 'vhich carries any remote suggestion that the 
legislature intended to change, for the purpose of com-
pensation insurance, any basic concept of insurance la\v. 
If the section were to be amended by the insertion of the 
\vords plaintiff would have this Court read between the 
lines, it would be doubled in length. 
The plaintiff's argument that Section 35-2-14 should 
be applied to determine \Yhich of successive carriers 
7 
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should be responsible as if they \vere successiYe employ-
ers will not bear scrutiny. To apply the Section as the 
plaintiff suggests would lead to a ridiculous result in any 
number of entirely probable situations. Suppose, for in-
stance, that an employer, then insured by a private car-
rier, employs a silicotic for the first time on No\·PmhPr 
15. He \Yorks underground in dusty environmPnt for 
thirty consecutive days. On December 1, ho\YeYer, thr 
employer's policy expires and he insures \vith the Statt\ 
Insurance Fund. The silicotic becomes dis a bled on Dt\-
cember 16. Who, under the plaintiff's theory, must 
respond? Plaintiff apparently belieYcs the emplo~Tc·r 
should pay the benefits, even though the employer ·wa~ 
al\vays insured as the la\Y requires and even if the em-
ployer "rere insolvent and unable to pay sueh benefits. 
The plaintiff cites the Deza case (Pacific En1ploycrs 
Ins. Co. v. Commission, 108 Utah 123) as authorit~T for 
the proposition \Ye no\v criticize. We submit that the 
Deza case says plainly and without equivocation that the 
carrier \\Tho must respond (\vhere there ha\7 C been t\vo 
or more carriers on the risk during the period of ex-
posure) is the one \vho insures the employer "on tltc 
date'' of last harmful exposure. On page 124, the Court 
makes this statement: 
''From the foregoing statement of facts, it is seen 
that the last exposure to silicon dioxide dust \vas 
June 7, 1943. The significant importance of this 
da.te will become apparent immediatly. '' (Our 
emphasis.) 
Again, on page 128, the Court says this: 
"As has been pointed out, hoV\Tever, June 7, 1943, 
8 
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1ras thf' daff' of the last ('.rposurr of the applicant 
to harmful quantitis of silicon dioxide dust, and 
from that date until his employment ceased because 
of total disability on March 25, 1944, he continued 
in the employ of the ~1:ines Company but in the 
eapacity of a watchman above ground on the prop-
erty of the Company. The insurance carrier a.t the 
time of such last exposure 'vas the State Insurance 
Fund; this is the date which fixes the liability of 
the employer, and consequently also attaches the 
liability to the employer's insurance carrier a.s of 
that date." (Our emphasis.) 
What the Deza case really says is that the critical date 
(in determining which carrier should respond) is the date 
of last exposure and not the date of disability. The Court 
specifically found that Deza. had never been harmfully ex-
posed while Pacific Employers was on the risk. There was 
no discussion at all about the need for thirty days' expo-
sure \vhile a particular carrier is on the risk. The thirty-
da.y c.riterion applies only to employers. It could not 
logically apply to both employers and carriers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant, 
United Park City Mines Co. 
9 
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